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Executive Summary
In late 2012, a governance assessment was carried out as part of 
the diagnosis phase of rollout of the CGIAR Aquatic Agricultural 
Systems Program in Malaita Hub in Solomon Islands. The purpose 
of the assessment was to identify and provide a basic understanding  
of essential aspects of governance related to Aquatic Agricultural 
Systems in general, and more specifically as a case study in  
natural resource management.
The underlying principles of the approach we have taken are 
drawn from an approach known as “Collaborating for Resilience” 
(CORE), which is based on bringing all key stakeholders into a 
process to ensure that multiple perspectives are represented 
(a listening phase), that local actors have opportunities to
 influence each other’s understanding (a dialogue phase), and 
that ultimately commitments to action are built (a choice phase) 
that would not be possible through an outsider’s analysis alone.
Four major governance issues were identified at three main levels 
of governance (local, sub national and national): 
1. family and community decision-making; 
2. poor links between community and national  
governance; 
3. little capacity for provincial government to provide  
services to support CBRM; and 
4. lack of impact or government presence at local level.
The design process for research in the Malaita Hub has identified 
a series of research initiatives that the program will tackle that are 
based on concerns, strengths and visions of Malaita community 
representatives and other hub level stakeholders. All of the  
governance levels and issues will need to be considered to  
different degrees in each initiative. In addition an “enabling”  
initiative entitled “cross scale governance and scaling” was  
identified as a priority area for research.
The participatory diagnosis and planning approach employed in 
the AAS Program Rollout has enabled the governance assessment 
to complete the listening phase of the CORE process and to start 
to address the dialogue phase. The process will be taken further 
during 2013 as the Hub research design is finalized.
1. Introduction
Governance, broadly speaking, is about how decisions are 
made on matters of public importance. Aquatic Agricultural 
Systems (AAS)1, like many complex socio-ecological 
systems, tend to involve a wide range of resource users with 
many competing interests. Understanding the governance 
context and promoting improvements in governance where 
possible are critical to achieving progress with regards to 
equitable resource allocation, access to markets, improvement  
of public services such as health and education, women’s 
empowerment and other factors that affect poverty, food 
security, and livelihood resilience.
The CGIAR Research Program Aquatic Agricultural Systems (AAS) 
(hereafter referred to as “the Program”) will target five countries, 
including Solomon Islands. In all countries, “Hubs” have 
been designated and defined as “geographic locations 
providing a focus for innovation, learning and impact through 
action research”. The first hub to be rolled out in Solomon 
Islands was the Malaita Hub. Rollout comprises a planning, 
scoping and a diagnosis phase prior to designing research 
activities for a hub (CGIAR Research Program on AAS, 2012b). 
The diagnosis step of the rollout of the Malaita Hub in Solomon 
Islands included a specific focus on the governance context 
affecting AAS dependent households. It aimed to identify 
and provide a basic understanding of essential aspects of  
governance primarily, but not solely, related to natural resource 
management.
In accordance with Ratner (2012), we identify the concerns of 
local actors about conflicting agendas, power, and politics 
beyond the local scale; the disconnected efforts or unclear 
division of responsibilities; and the poor responsiveness to local 
needs on the part of government, private sector, and civil society 
groups as indications of governance issues that need to be 
assessed. As an input to program design, we and the stakeholders 
have sought to understand how governance functions in practice, 
who influences key decisions around AAS systems, what the key 
issues and potential collaborative ways forward are.
Over the years, researchers have slowly developed some 
understanding of the complex governance interactions at 
community level in AAS-dependent Solomon Islands communities, 
but this has often been obtained within a sectoral lens (fisheries, 
agriculture or forestry, for example). This report begins to address 
governance from an AAS perspective, using input from AAS 
households and other networked stakeholders. We attempt to 
summarize governance issues that are found not only within the 
community but also, and especially, those that are beyond the 
local level, both of which may need to be addressed by the AAS 
program.
We identify key issues that emerged from scoping and diagnosis 
within the Malaita Hub between February and September 2012, 
including the outputs from a stakeholder consultation workshop 
and a community consultation workshop, and explore the 
applicability of several frameworks for characterizing governance 
in relation to AAS. While the analysis is focused on AAS in Malaita 
Province, it also places the governance topics within a national 
context.
The Malaita Hub Development Challenge
The scoping phase resulted in the identification of Malaita 
Province as the first hub where implementation of the  
Program would occur in Solomon Islands. A hub development 
challenge statement was articulated to focus the design of 
the Program in the province:
“Rural people in the Malaita Hub of Solomon Islands face major 
challenges from rising population and declining quality and 
availability of marine and land resources. The development 
challenge is to improve their lives through more productive, 
diversified livelihoods that empower communities to be better 
able to adapt to change and make more effective use of their 
resources. The research challenge we will address with the people 
of Malaita Hub is to develop and test alternative approaches 
to livelihood diversification and resource stewardship that will 
accelerate development and restore the productivity of their 
resources”. 
2. Methods of governance assessment
Governance has been highlighted as a key factor in the planning, 
implementation and ultimate success of development interventions 
and has received attention at the global and national scale. This 
is further reflected in a wide range of approaches used to 
conceptualize governance (Pahl-Wostl 2009, ODI 2006).
The underlying principles of the approach we have taken are 
drawn from a process known as “Collaborating for Resilience” 
1 AAS are defined as systems in which the annual production dynamics of freshwater and/or saline or brackish coastal systems  
  contribute significantly to total household income (CGIAR Research Program on AAS 2012a).
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or CORE (Ratner and Smith, 2013). The CORE method is based 
on bringing all key stakeholders into the process to ensure that 
multiple perspectives will be represented, that local actors will 
have opportunities to influence each other’s understanding and 
that commitment to action that would not be possible through 
an outsider’s analysis alone will be built.
The approach entails active listening to deepen awareness of 
the problem, the possibilities, and the perspectives of different 
groups; sharing and debating competing points of view to ensure 
a full understanding of the forces at play; and, finally, narrowing in 
on the particular realm of actions within an individual’s or group’s 
control. As applied to governance assessment, these three phases 
focus on:
1. identifying obstacles and opportunities in the governance 
context (the listening phase);
2. debating alternative courses of action or strategies that  
address these obstacles or take advantage of these  
opportunities (the dialogue phase); and
3. planning and undertaking collaborative actions (the choice 
phase). 
The participatory diagnosis and planning approach employed in 
the AAS Program Rollout has enabled the governance assessment 
to complete the listening phase and start to address the dialogue 
phase. The dialogue and choice phases will be taken further  
during 2013 as the Hub research design is finalized. An action 
plan will be an outcome of the Design workshop choice phase.
As part of adaptive learning, additional cycles will occur to  
produce more detailed plans and actions. Learning from these 
(listening again), debating what to do next (dialogue), and 
adapting (choice) will be an ongoing process.
In preparation for further dialogue, the analysis presented  
here draws on two frameworks: the analytical framework for  
collaborative governance assessment in AAS (Ratner et al. 2012, 
Ratner 2012), and the FAO forest governance assessment tool 
(PROFOR 2011, Kishore and Rosenbaum 2012). In both cases, the 
framework includes guidance on participatory diagnostic processes 
which, although not adhered to explicitly in this case, are not 
incompatible with the “best practice” participatory AAS process.
Collaborative Governance Assessment
CORE is a process designed to build dialogue among local  
actors that enables collaborative action aimed at transforming  
multi-stakeholder competition and conflict over natural  
resources. It provides a framework for understanding stakeholder 
interaction and for organizing social and institutional change. 
CORE is distinguished by its emphasis on whole systems, its open 
search for solutions, and its explicit treatment of power (Ratner 
and Smith 2013, Ratner 2012).
Building on the CORE process, the framework for collaborative 
governance assessment in AAS (Ratner et al. 2012; Ratner 2012) 
focuses on three dimensions of governance — stakeholder  
representation, distribution of authority, and mechanisms of 
accountability. Under each of these dimensions the characteristics 
of different governance arrangements are assessed using key 
questions to help orient analysis (Figure 1). The assessment 
includes both formal and informal mechanisms that emphasize 
how decision-making works in practice, which may differ  
significantly from how it works in principle.
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Key Question
Which actors are  
represented in  
decision-making and  
how?
Stakeholder
representation
Includes decision-making 
regarding specific 
land, water, or fisheries 
resources and also the 
broader context of policy 
and implementation that 
influence the livelihoods of 
resource users and other 
local stakeholders.
Dimensions of governance affecting 
development of AAS
Distribution of
authority
Accountability
mechanisms
How is formal and informal 
authority distributed in 
decisions over resource 
access, management, 
enforcement, dispute 
resolution, and  
benefit-sharing?  
How are power-holders 
held accountable for their 
decisions and to whom?
Includes authority 
regarding decisions over 
resource tenure rules,  
taxation, and basin or 
coastal-zone planning, 
including transboundary 
arrangements.  
Consider generic 
governance reform trends, 
such as decentralization, 
regional integration, or 
market liberalization.  
Applies equally to the  
exercise of public and 
private authority.
Measured in three  
directions: upward  
(towards higher-level 
authorities); horizontal  
(to stakeholders 
in other sectors or
localities); downward (to 
resource users and other 
community members).
Guidance for assessment
Issues of concern
Representation of politically, 
economically, or socially 
marginalized groups, 
which may include landless 
poor, women-headed  
households, internally 
displaced persons, ethnic 
minorities, etc.  
Gender disparities in  
representation often  
critical at multiple scales.
Relative strength of upward, 
horizontal, and downward 
accountabilities.
Transaction costs involved 
in keeping decision-makers 
accountable.
Integration of  
decision-making across  
sectors or horizontal  
inequalities among  
regional, ethnic, or  
user groups.
Clarity in distribution of 
authority (overlaps can be  
a source of conflict).
Appropriateness of  
distribution in equity and 
efficiency terms.
Capacity of institutions  
endowed with certain 
powers to execute them 
effectively.  
Adaptability of rights to 
changing conditions.
Figure 1. Key questions and considerations in analyzing the governance context for development of aquatic agricultural systems (Source: Ratner et al. 2012).
PROFOR forest governance assessment tool
The Program on Forests (PROFOR) framework (PROFOR 2011, 
Kishore & Rosenbaum 2012) emerges from major forest governance 
assessment approaches spurred on by the challenges presented 
by REDD+. The framework draws on the World Bank’s Framework 
for Forest Governance Reform, the World Resources Institute’s 
Governance of Forests Initiative and the proposed draft 
UN-REDD/Chatham House Framework for Monitoring REDD+ 
Governance. It also builds on existing national forest 
governance-related monitoring systems.
The tool aims to provide a diagnostic assessment that identifies 
areas of governance needing reform. It can also identify priorities, 
encourage discussion of specific steps to be taken, and aims to 
help build consensus for reform. The tool includes core 
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parameters that are shared by many processes and initiatives 
that are not necessarily in the forest sector and may facilitate 
discussion across them.
The PROFOR framework adopts three generally accepted pillars 
of governance: 
a.  policy, institutional and legal frameworks, 
b.  planning and decision-making processes and 
c.   implementation, enforcement and compliance. 
These pillars frame questions that are inspired by experiences 
documented in the governance literature and are guided by 
principles of good governance (accountability, effectiveness, 
efficiency, equity, participation, transparency) (Table 1).
Additional considerations for choice of tools
There is an abundant literature on approaches to assessing 
governance and a few points from that literature are relevant to 
note here as the research questions around governance of AAS in 
Solomon Islands begin to be better defined. We note that many 
of the stakeholders we have consulted have no experience with a 
functioning government that is effectively addressing their needs, 
hence they may struggle to pinpoint aspects of government 
service delivery that are lacking. 
In a comprehensive review, Pahl-Wostl (2009) introduced  
the following four dimensions as a basis for analyzing the  
characteristics of environmental governance regimes:
•	 institutions and the relationship and relative importance of 
formal and informal institutions
•	 actor networks with emphasis on the role and interactions 
of state and non-state actors
•	 multi-level interactions across administrative boundaries 
and vertical integration
•	 governance modes—bureaucratic hierarchies, markets, 
networks 
The degree to which informal and formal institutions are 
addressed through the CORE and PROFOR approaches may not 
adequately cover these dimensions. More emphasis on aspects 
relating to different levels of governance and interactions 
between and across these, including networks and modes 
of governance in the private sector, would seem warranted.
These reviews suggests that identifying key governance issues 
and the way forward in the Malaita Hub should ensure that 
participatory consultations and analysis include explicit  
consideration of:
•	 functional networks for governance and information  
dissemination; 
•	 institutional capacities including budgets, human  
resources and limiting factors; and 
•	 governance functions of formal and informal actors at  
different scales.
Policy, regulatory, institutional 
and legal framework
1.1 Resource-related policies  
       and laws
1.2 Legal framework to support    
       and land tenure, ownership  
       and use rights
1.3 Concordance of broa der  
       development policies with   
       resource policies
1.4 Institutional frameworks
1.5 Financial incentives,  
       economic instruments and  
       benefit sharing
Planning and decision-making 
process
2.1 Stakeholder participation
2.2 Transparency and  
       accountability
2.3 Stakeholder capacity and 
       action
Implementation, enforcement 
and compliance
3.1 Administration of natural  
       resources
3.2 Resource management law 
       enforcement
3.3 Administration of land/sea   
       tenure and property rights
3.4 Cooperation and  
       coordination
3.5 Measures to address  
       corruption
Table 1. Framework for assessing and monitoring forest governance including components of each of the three pillars (PROFOR-FAO 2011).
Approach used
Characterization of governance in the hub: The analytical 
framework of Ratner et al. (2012) was used to provide a first 
characterization using inputs primarily from the Scoping/National 
reports and primary literature and focuses on the three dimensions  
of governance concerning stakeholder representation, distribution 
of authority and mechanisms of accountability.
Identification of issues and opportunities: The issues and 
opportunities raised by those interviewed and consulted  
regarding hub resource governance were scrutinized using a 
modified PROFOR framework. Thus the three PROFOR pillars of 
governance-Policy( institutional and legal frameworks); Planning 
(including decision-making processes and Implementation) and 
Enforcement and compliance-were further subdivided into three 
levels of governance: community, sub national (district as well  
as provincial) and national. These have been identified as relevant 
levels at which resource governance decisions are taken in  
Solomon Islands (Govan et al., 2011) (Figure 2).
1. Community level: Most coastal management is 
implemented and enforced at the community2 level.
2. Sub national level, an intermediary level that includes: 
District/catchment/community cluster levels: Neighboring 
communities that share social and ecological systems and 
concerns (e.g. upstream effects, catchment areas, areas 
key to the life cycles of target species or social and cultural 
obligations, language and heritage).  
Provincial level: Provincial government and other institutions 
that formally/informally coordinate and implement 
management functions at a provincial scale and that may 
facilitate interactions between communities.
3. National level: National government and formal/informal 
institutions (including NGOs and networks) that operate at 
a national scale.
2 For the purposes of this analysis “community” refers to one or more settlements that consider themselves one community and would tend to work or 
  plan together.
7
Figure 2. Design for proposed Community Based Resource Management (CBRM) governance structure in Solomon Islands (Govan et al 2011) which 
illustrates institutional and social organization scales at which resource governance decisions are taken in Solomon Islands.
3. Characterization of AAS governance in the 
hub: coastal resources as a case study
A summary of literature on coastal resource governance in  
Solomon Islands (Lane 2006, Healy 2006, McDonald 2006, SILRC 
2012, MECM/MFMR 2009, Govan et al. 2011) (Table 2) describes 
the Solomon Islands’ coastal resource governance system as  
one which is weak in formal stakeholder representation and  
mechanisms of accountability, but that is tempered by informal 
local or civil society mechanisms. The strong de facto and, to a 
slightly lesser extent, de jure acknowledgement of community 
rights, including over resource tenure, provides a strong basis for 
informal accountability processes. But this strength has not been 
supported by adequate formal mechanisms for community  
representation in provincial or national policy and decision-making, 
or by instruments that ensure accountability of government 
agencies to community groups.
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Stakeholder representation Distribution of authority Accountability mechanisms
Formal mechanisms Weak representation of citizens 
through national parliamentary 
and party political system1
Poorly functional environmental 
impact assessment and  
monitoring procedures3,4
Slow progress in effectively 
reflecting rural concerns in
national policy7 
Lack of representation of 
women in national and Hub 
provincialgovernment5,6
+  Strong acknowledgement of  
     local resource owners’ rights8 
•	 Customary land tenure 
and rights 
•	 De facto customary 
inshore tenure  
Some government sectoral 
policy e.g. National laws 
regulating fisheries bans and 
moratoria11 
Provincial delegated 
responsibilities on fisheries 
and natural resources11,12 
Slow emergence of district or 
village decision-making bodies, 
e.g. village development  
committees or district councils14
 
Scanty provincial ordinance and 
by laws13
-  Weak or poorly enforced 
   mechanisms of accountability 
   of government and elected  
   representatives to communities 
Occasional national enforcement 
of laws (eg ban on export of 
BdM, dynamiters) – MFMR,  
police14,15 Rare use of complaints 
to Public Solicitors Office 
Constituency development 
funds (handled by MPs) disburse 
far more public money than 
provincial governments but are 
not effectively monitored2
Informal mechanisms +  Strong community institutions8 
•	 Traditional leaders
•	 Councils
•	 Committees  
+  Heavy reliance on civil society  
     networks and ad hoc 
     mechanisms 
•	 Traditional leaders
•	 Church9
•	 Gatherings for market, 
clinics, schools 
•	 NGO projects and others
•	 SILMMA network 
•	 NGO participatory 
projects 
-   Weak women’s representation 
    in community decisions relating 
    to marine resources*
+  Authority concentrated  
     locally in resource owning  
     units – families or tribes8 
     and traditional leaders and  
     institutions
Authority exercised to a lesser 
extent by:
•	 Village management 
committees 
•	 Councils of leaders or 
chiefs (district/province)
•	 Church leaders and 
groups9,10
+  Customary and community 
      enforcement, conflict 
      resolution and sanctions8 
Civil society mediation–church, 
NGOs, networks 
Newspapers and other media for 
airing public grievances
Table 2. Characteristics of formal and informal mechanisms for coastal resource governance context in the Hub using the CORE framework. Summary 
observations are highlighted: key strengths (+), weaknesses (-) and priority issues. Information derives from references cited (Govan et al 2013) 
Sources: * National Scoping Report, 1 Clements and Foley 2008, 2 World Bank 2011, 3 Thomas 2006, 4 Berdach and Llegu 2007, 5 World Bank 2012,
 6 IFC 2010, 7 Haque 2012, 8 Wairiu et al 2003, 9 RAMSI 2011, 10 Bird 2007, 11 McDonald 2006, 12 Lane 2006, 13 Healy 2006, MECM/MFMR 2009, 
14 Govan 2013, 15 Pakoa 2012.
The Solomon Islands government provides some essential 
services to provincial communities, such as education, health care 
and sanitation, but for the majority of Solomon Islanders there is 
limited interaction with national or even provincial government. 
The deficit in staffing and budgetary allocation for Solomon 
Islands environmental governance at national and provincial 
levels (Govan et al 2011) is reflected in most other sectors (ARDS 
2007, World Bank 2011), resulting in relatively little formal 
capacity to exercise authority in rural areas.
Recognizing the above, there have been recent moves to increase 
the institutional and financial capacity of provincial governments 
(PGSP/MPGIS 2011). There are early indications of progress in 
terms of increased budgets and administrative capacity (e.g. in 
Govan 2013) and, on paper at least, there is a strengthening of 
policy (if not institutions) supporting community based coastal 
resource management (MFMR Corporate plan 2012, MECM/MFMR 
2009). Examples include the focus on community-based fisheries 
management of the Inshore Fisheries Strategy, emphasis on 
community and provincial engagement in the Agriculture and 
Rural Development Strategy and community emphasis in 
environmental policy such as NBSAP or NAPA (see MECM/MFMR 
2009 for review). This represents an opportunity for increased 
support to community approaches to development and natural 
resource governance, however at this stage there is still insufficient 
government capacity (in terms of logistics, skills or personnel) for 
implementation. Thus the practical aspects of effective support 
for community based resource management approaches are 
largely still to be defined. This represents both a challenge and an 
opportunity.
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Currently, coastal resource management decisions are largely 
made at the community level based on customary rights and local 
governance mechanisms. These informal governance mechanisms 
are to some extent bolstered by civil society, including churches 
or NGO projects and networks (National Scoping Report). Churches 
can form a major axis of interaction between communities.
The community governance systems are increasingly under stress. 
Commercial market pressure on fish and invertebrate stocks has 
led to a breakdown in their traditional management (cf. National 
Scoping Report). Forestry, mining and the effects of modernization 
(including improved communications) are leading to increased 
consumerism and diverging aspirations within communities. 
Growing urban areas demand increased input from natural  
resources at the village level, with an expectation of increased  
access for traders and developers. Major developments such  
as logging and mining are one area where government and  
communities have some interaction with each other in terms  
of seeking consent from legal land-owning groups. However  
procedures for these have not worked smoothly in the past  
and have seldom included environmental and social impact  
assessments and mitigation. 
National networks form around projects such as the TNC Rapid 
Assessment (Green et al., 2009), although these are predominantly  
comprised of NGO representatives and if they are project funded, 
they tend to be short lived. The oldest national marine resource 
network is the Solomon Islands Locally Managed Marine Area 
(SILMMA) network which began in 2003 and focuses on  
exchange of experiences between communities and NGOs. 
SILMMA has also served to some extent as a forum for policy  
discussion and the development of best practice guides that 
include community perspectives. Sub national networks have 
emerged, often linked to longer running projects such as the 
University of California Santa Barbara-sponsored network of  
villages in Roviana Lagoon (also linked to the Christian Fellowship 
Church), which has had some success in socializing models of 
community resource management. Other subnational networks 
that connect a small number of villages include the Central  
Islands Province Natural Resource Management Network 
(GERUSA) and MINBALT in Marovo Lagoon. Notably, none of these 
resource management networks has a presence or is active in the 
Province of Malaita. In the agricultural sector, local NGO Kastom 
Gaden Association administers a planting material network, 
which has over 3000 members nation-wide including Malaita.
Many of these networks can be described as functioning  
sub-optimally, at best. Nevertheless, their existence does provide 
a venue for information sharing, opportunities for improved 
decision-making about local resources and opportunities for 
more strategic engagement with government, either in seeking 
support or influencing policy.
4. Identification of governance issues and  
opportunities in AAS in Malaita
The hub stakeholder consultation workshop (with provincial and 
national government and NGO representatives in attendance) 
highlighted broad natural resource issues concerning mangrove 
management, including the integration or coordination of  
support from government and donors, poor land use planning, 
land disputes and the lack of information and knowledge at 
the community level. Opportunities identified by stakeholders 
included various strategies for improving awareness, sharing of 
experience and education, increasingly incorporating community 
concerns into provincial government planning, and utilization of 
existing networks (e.g. churches, women’s wards and councils).
From a specific governance session in the hub community 
consultation workshop, greater detail was obtained on 
decision-making mechanisms at levels near or at the community. 
In general, the male heads of family have a predominant role and 
at the wider community level this encompasses chiefs and other 
leaders. There is general consensus that provincial authorities and 
representatives need to be much more involved in providing  
services (extension), developing provincial level legislation that 
takes into account people’s concerns (e.g. around resource  
management) and enforcing such legislation. There was  
little awareness of the role that national authorities have in  
environmental governance. In part, this reflects the fact that there 
are no national environment staff based on Malaita, and the one 
fisheries officer who is a national appointee is (along with the 
provincial fisheries officers) rarely resourced to travel outside the 
provincial capital Auki except to accompany NGO’s or donors. 
In the opinion of the participants, national environmental and 
fisheries legislation is removed from the reality of rural people 
and their experience is that it is seldom enforced. Participants feel 
that citizens have little or no voice or influence at the national 
level. This statement derives from their feeling of a disconnect 
with current legislation andits lack of enforcement and i may be 
related to their impression that “Provincial government agencies 
need to be involved in decisions [around resource management 
and planning]. Community participants felt that the provincial 
government is probably not involved enough because they are 
not necessarily the custodians [of resources] however they do 
have the right, because national government allocates budgets 
for that purpose”. Though women are reported to have a role in 
some land management decisions, it is generally felt that they 
are excluded to a greater or lesser extent from coastal and marine 
resource decision-making.
The issues and opportunities raised in the stakeholder  
consultation workshop and the community consultation  
workshop were framed using the modified PROFOR tool for  
each of the three identified levels of governance (Tables 3-5).
“The village of Walende’s experience with Earth Island  
Institute had made them realize they could have a direct line 
to NGOs and even though they thought the government  
(provincial and national) should be involved in decision-making  
around the dolphin issue for example, they just are not. So 
why bother with government they asked?”
Box 1. Example from community consultation workshop.
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Policy, regulatory, institutional 
and legal frameworks
Planning and decision-making 
processes
Implementation, enforcement 
and compliance
Community level +     Strong recognition of 
         customary tenure and
         rights over resources. 
+      Traditional and 
         community leadership
         institutions recognized
         but eroding 
+     Customary reciprocity 
        and benefits sharing 
        mechanisms
-       Tenure and leadership
        undocumented and areas
        of confusion or dispute
        increasing 
-      Little representation of
        communities in policy
        development and higher
        level planning
-      Hard to control 
        financial incentives
        towards unsustainable
        resource exploitation
+      Relatively strong 
         customary and community
         processes for planning and 
         decision-making 
+     Traditional and local
        knowledge is a major asset
+     Some communities have
        NGO support for planning
+/-  Customary conflict 
        management processes
        vary in effectiveness and
        are eroding under pressure 
-      Lack of participation of
        government or provincial
        authorities 
-      Lack of information 
        provision from higher 
        levels of government (eg
        mangrove management) 
-      Some areas of traditional 
        knowledge concerning
        management of resources
        under pressure are 
        inadequate (need 
        education, info etc) 
-      Lack of participation
        of women in marine
        resource and garden 
        planning decisions
+     Customary and 
        community enforcement,
        conflict resolution and
        sanctions are carried out in
        many/some communities
        without external support 
+     Local observations and
        knowledge used for M+E
-       Local enforcement faces 
        challenges from some 
        community members
        and from commercial/
        artisanal fishing interes
         from other communities.
-      Local management is not 
        necessarily supported
        by government or police,
        though it can in legal
        principle
-       Little or no support from 
        national or provincial
        agencies 
-       Increasing land disputes
        and lack of land use 
        planning hard to handle 
        at local level 
-       Local courts need 
        more support or 
        encouragement
Policy, regulatory, institutional 
and legal frameworks
Planning and decision-making 
processes
Implementation, enforcement 
and compliance
District level +      Traditional networks and
         relations between 
         communities 
-       No formal district political
        institutions, potentially 
        ward development 
        committees
-      Often large differences 
        between coastal and 
        terrestrial social groups
+       Some informal or civil 
society mechanisms for 
discussion (church,  
traditional links, NGO 
projects or networks, 
          councils of chiefs/leaders)
-       No formal district level 
processes – potentially 
under forthcoming  
provisions for ward  
development plans
+      Some use of traditional 
and revived networks  
(e.g. council of chiefs, 
church ) to address wider 
area issues and rule  
breaking from outside 
individual communities 
(alluded to slightly by 
CCW)
-         In some places, no  
functioning Council  
of chiefs although a  
recognized desire amongst 
some for this to be 
           formalized
Provincial level +     Provincial government
        with delegated 
        responsibilities for fisheries 
        and natural resources
-      Provincial government
        lacks resources 
-      Lack of provincial 
        ordinance and/or 
        integrated management
        plans 
-      Inadequate revenue 
       raising provisions esp.
        rom natural resources
+      Increasing commitment 
         of donors and 
         government to  
strengthen provincial 
governments
-       Inadequate provisions  
and resources for 
         management planning 
-       Inadequate flow of 
         information from 
         government and 
         communities
+      Increasing capacity and 
budgets an opportunity 
for a greater role in 
         resource management
+      Provincial and sub  
provincial networks
         (mainly civil society) 
         provide avenues for 
         information sharing and 
some collaboration on 
enforcement
-       Little current provincial 
coordination or support 
for resource management, 
land use planning, 
         extension services
Table 3. Analysis of AAS governance issues using PROFOR (2011) framework at the community level as discussed in the text. Features and issues raised by 
participants in the SCW or CCW are italicized, others were identified during scoping. Symbols: strengths (+),weaknesses (-) and priority issues.
Table 4. Analysis of AAS governance issues using PROFOR (2011) framework at sub national level as discussed in the text. Features and issues raised by 
participants in the SCW or CCW are italicized, others were identified during scoping. Symbols: strengths (+), weaknesses (-) and priority issues.
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Policy, regulatory, institutional 
and legal frameworks
Planning and decision-making 
processes
Implementation, enforcement 
and compliance
National level +      Clear legal recognition 
of terrestrial customary 
tenure 
+      Supportive policy 
         emerging in fisheries, 
environment and climate 
change sector for 
         community governance 
         of resources
+      National civil society 
networks (church, NGOs, 
SILMMA) 
+/-   developing impact 
         assessment frameworks 
-       Institutions for coastal 
         resource management 
lack capacity and 
         appropriate structures
-        Lack of functioning 
          National coordination 
mechanisms for level 
government and 
          donor support 
          (poss. excep. NCC)
-       Legislation in support 
         of coastal resource 
         governance inadequate 
         or stalled 
-       Forest and other natural 
resource policies only 
just beginning to move 
towards sustainable 
         development 
-        Weak or nonexistent 
marine resource 
         management plans 
-        Inadequate safeguards 
against corruption and 
perverse economic 
         incentives
-       Ministry of Fisheries has 
not implemented gender 
in Fisheries strategy or 
policy
+      Relatively strong civil 
society organizations for 
support and oversight
+/-   Emerging but still 
         inadequate processes for 
national consultation and 
planning (e.g. NCC, recent 
fisheries policy meetings)
-       Government procedures 
for supporting coastal 
resource management do 
not exist(lack of capacity 
and resources) 
-       Deficient mechanisms for 
transparency and access 
to information 
-        Weak provision of 
          information and sharing 
of experiences by 
          government to citizens
-       No formal functional 
         oversight mechanisms
-       Deficient corporate 
responsibility e.g. logging 
companies or sea food 
buyers
+      Government support 
of partnerships and 
networks to local achieve 
resource management 
aims
+      National ministries of 
fisheries and environment 
undergoing institutional 
strengthening to 
         provide better local 
         services 
+      Ministry of Agriculture 
established a network of 
women extension officers 
throughout the Provinces
-       Little capacity of ministry 
and police to enforce 
national or local resource 
management rules
-        Little to no capacity of  
judicial system to enforce 
local coastal resource  
management rules 
-        Challenges to handling 
          of land disputes
-       No cross sectoral 
         collaboration 
         mechanisms/no formal 
co-ordination between 
agriculture and fisheries 
(e.g. both currently have 
aquaculture initiatives)
Table 5. Analysis of AAS governance issues using PROFOR (2011) framework at national level as discussed in the text. Features and issues raised by
 participants in the SCW or CCW are italicized, others were identified during scoping. Symbols: strengths (+),weaknesses (-) and priority issues.
5. Major AAS governance issues by level 
of governance
Four major governance issues have been summarized from Tables 
3-5: family and community decision-making, poor community 
governance links to national governance, little capacity for 
provincial government to provide services to support CBRM, 
and lack of impact or presence of government at local level.
The design process for research in the Malaita Hub is identifying 
a series of research initiatives that the Program will tackle that are 
based on concerns, strengths and the visions of Malaita community 
representatives and other hub level stakeholders. One of the 
initiatives identified in a November 2012 Design Workshop was 
“Marine Resource Management”, which includes CBRM (Figure 
2). All of the governance levels (Tables 3-5) and issues must be 
considered in this initiative. To help direct thinking with respect to 
strengthening governance, governance issues and opportunities 
have been related to the Marine Resource Management initiative 
in recognition that there will be cross-overs to other initiatives 
that can be modified accordingly during the design process.
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Example of AAS governance context from an AAS 
community in Malaita, Malaita Hub. Source: Fidali-Hickie 
and Whippy-Morris (2005).
The people of Langalanga lagoon are highly dependent on 
shell money (products derived from naturally occurring marine 
shells) for cash and in some cases for daily survival. “The people... 
strongly believe that the industry will survive up to the moment 
they pull the last shell from the ocean. Because people are 
culturally attached to the craft and because they have few 
economic alternatives it is not easy for them to stop making shell 
money, even though returns are meager as costs rise”.
Shells are now scarce and becoming more expensive; all evidence 
suggests that current harvesting rates are unsustainable. The 
resource status and the threats to it have long been widely 
recognized from household level, to national government 
and outside the country amongst regional organizations 
and researchers; and yet, few alternative livelihoods and no 
management initiatives have been sustained.
Some villagers maintain the industry will only be sustained if 
harvest is controlled; some have suggested re-stocking and many 
recognize the need for regulations and enforcement around 
general reef habitat destruction. The appropriate governance 
environment to enable this is not universally agreed. “Men tend 
to support the idea of chiefly taboos whereas women are more 
likely to suggest that government should enact laws to govern 
harvesting ...One of the factors handicapping the use of taboos 
is the heterogeneous makeup of some communities and the 
absence of a tribal chief. Resources are treated as common 
property. No one in particular has the right to control access......
There is widespread concern and a good deal of good sense is 
evident in people’s suggested remedies. Yet no one suggested 
that shell money producers on their own could collectively 
manage the resource/marketing/pricing etc. Everyone looked 
outside of his or her family unit for leadership-to the government 
or to their chiefs.”
Local level
1. Family and community decision-making
Community decision-making and implementation are the basis 
of hub AAS governance at present. Although this will remain key 
for the foreseeable future, workshop participants suggest that 
decision-making at this level is not as robust as it once was. In 
the absence of more centralized governance alternatives, this 
could have serious environmental and social impacts. Traditional 
decision-making processes may not have previously had to deal 
with the current high pressures on subsistence resources or with 
decisions related to major developments that can be expected to 
have long term consequences.
Stakeholders have identified that decision-making at the family 
and community level has changed over time (e.g. reduced role  
of elders). They suggested that improving or widening the  
participation of local stakeholders in decision-making could 
be expected to improve the quality of information available to 
people in the community and result in more inclusive decisions 
that take into account all stakeholder concerns. This is important 
for AAS goals such as better land use planning and adopting 
sustainable cropping practices (e.g. fixed gardens, implementing 
resource management plans).
Key issues: 
•	 Community stakeholders say that within the household  
both men and women participate in decision-making.  
Beyond the household however, participation of women 
varies between regions. In some areas women have no 
further say in any decision-making (according to the men 
who attended the workshop). In others (where women 
were represented), women are variously involved in  
community level decision-making around AAS issues (what 
and when to plant and land use issues), but among these 
groups there is universal agreement that women are only 
involved on the periphery and should be more involved in 
the future.
•	 In the absence of any formal mechanisms or frameworks 
for community governance, many villages have continued 
to use traditional mechanisms. However, these do not 
always enjoy the support they formerly had for a variety of 
reasons, including that they cannot respond adequately to 
modern or external threats, they fail to link to the evolving 
ambitions of the younger generation, they cannot address 
the increasing influence from the outside world and the 
loss of traditional governance, and they fail with the  
formally educated younger generation that has lost 
respect for the traditional knowledge and practices of 
uneducated elders (stakeholder consultation workshop).
•	 In some places the quality and functions of leadership are 
deteriorating, with leaders absent or perceived to exhibit 
excessive self-interest, thus reducing community under-
standing and/or acceptance of traditional governance.
Suggestions from stakeholders: 
•	 decision-making can sometimes include more involvement 
of extended families 
•	 the knowledge of resource people and older people could 
be better acknowledged and more widely utilized 
•	 decision-making would benefit from a general increase 
in participation of resource owners, tribal leaders, women 
and youths 
•	 there is need to ensure that knowledge is passed on to the 
next generation
Opportunities 
Opportunities would appear to center around improved 
community decision-making processes and increased 
representation or participation by marginalized or 
sidelined groups. The evolution of community and traditional 
organizations in the face of the upper level governance vacuum 
presents opportunities for improvements in community 
and sub-national level governance derived from experiences 
elsewhere – in Solomon Islands, but particularly Vanuatu and 
PNG. Research questions center on who should be involved in 
decision-making and how to ensure that the structures communities 
put in place to manage their development are sustainable.
2. Poor community governance links to national governance
Communities have little opportunity to interact with sub national 
or national government or to have their voices heard and acted 
upon. Traditional and more recent community institutions such as 
associations are not equipped to influence policy, request services 
or seek accountability.
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Key issues: 
•	 National government ministries have poor connections to 
communities 
•	 Communities rarely see extension officers from agriculture, 
fisheries or environment ministries 
•	 Community Associations and local political bodies can 
“confer power and be used for good and evil” 
Suggestions from stakeholders: 
•	 The role of other institutions (e.g. churches) could be used 
to better effect
Opportunity 
The experiences of civil society organizations at various levels  
provide opportunities for increasing the links between  
communities and government. The opportunity exists to build 
and strengthen resource management related networks in 
Malaita (none of the resource management networks mentioned 
above are active in any way in Malaita). These could provide for a 
for communities to access and share information and services and 
communicate with and influence provincial and national decision 
makers. Research questions will be developed around whether 
and how these networks bring about change in communities and 
how such networks can be sustained.
Sub national level
The community level would benefit from certain services that 
could be most efficiently provided at sub provincial or provincial 
levels. Presently the key services have not been identified or 
prioritized and lack financial and human resources and, to some 
extent, clear policy or legal support. Other services that are less 
frequently identified by community stakeholders but would still 
seem important are coordination of AAS resource management at 
the provincial and sub provincial levels (ecosystem).
3. Little capacity for provincial government to provide services 
to support CBRM
Decentralized governance in Solomon Islands implies reforms at 
two key interfaces: between government and provinces and  
between provinces and communities. A provincial level  
governance structure is mandated on paper to fulfill resource 
management functions. It has been legally decentralized but does 
not have the support or the capacity to carry out its functions. The 
functions of the province need to be developed in accordance 
with their mandate and tested as part of an overall decentralization  
process.
Key issues:
•	 The role of representatives to the provincial assembly 
(PMPs) is unclear and needs improvement in terms of 
representation. 
•	 Provincial government agencies are not involved enough 
in resourcing, providing legislation or enforcement. 
•	 There is lack of provincial policy, ordinance and byelaws. 
•	 Provincial government lacks staff, capacity and resources
•	 There is little or no flow of basic information from  
government to communities.
Suggestions from stakeholders:  
•	 In the context of non-functioning Houses of Chiefs, some 
areas have a desire to re-empower traditional, not elected, 
chiefs. 
•	 Networks could be used better to bridge levels of  
governance (e.g. SILMMA). 
•	 The role of local courts should be explored, especially  
for dispute resolution relating to land or resources. 
•	 Linkages between fisheries and agricultural research or 
extension should be made. 
Opportunity 
The way forward should contemplate joint identification by 
communities and provincial government of priority services and 
design of strategic minimum services within existing constraints 
and enabling environment considerations (e.g. policy or  
judiciary). There is potential for improved use of existing  
networks or mechanisms (church etc.) for delivery of services to  
communities by provincial government and other institutions  
at that level (there is potential for partnership with World Vision,  
a faith based development organization with the skills and  
resources to design suitable programs for outreach).
Opportunities may exist for using initiatives such as CBRM as a 
point of common focus for dialogue about perceived bottlenecks 
such as the House of Chiefs and Provincial ordinances and about 
clarification and development of the role of local courts.
National levels
Despite an increasing acceptance (reflected in policy) that 
community led resource management and indeed community 
involvement in all types of planning is a cornerstone of natural 
resource management, this is still to be reflected in viable 
operational strategies at the national level let alone in budgets 
and manpower. This will remain a major challenge as long as the 
current under-resourcing persists. 
4. Lack of impact or presence of government at local level
Key issues: 
•	 Some communities have a poor understanding of the roles 
of government organizations. 
•	 MPs need to be more involved and to improve representation  
of citizens. 
•	 Judicial systems need more involvement in land disputes 
(development).
•	 There are few bridging institutions to bring government 
and civil society together. 
•	 Communities often undertake livelihoods in the absence 
of appropriate information. 
•	 A national approach to CBRM has been drafted and  
discussed, but is yet to be effectively implemented. 
•	 It is unclear how different levels of government can most 
effectively contribute to better marine and land resource 
management 
•	 There is lack of information from government to communities.
Suggestions from stakeholders:  
•	 Cross-sectoral fora and provincial networks are needed. 
•	 There should be implementation of a nationally  
appropriate, strategic approach to support community 
based initiatives.
Opportunities 
Key opportunities include building on current network analyses 
for Solomon Islands (Cohen et al. 2011) and ongoing institutional 
assessments (Govan et al 2011 and Govan 2013) to assist  
government in the design and implementation of sustainable 
decentralized strategies that support provincial and community 
based management. This would include providing information 
to the people that will promote an understanding of proposed 
government strategies to support community priorities and  
initiatives, thereby empowering communities to have a voice in 
the services they need from government.
6. Next Steps
The participatory diagnosis and planning approach employed in 
the AAS Program Rollout has seen the listening phase completed 
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for governance assessment and the beginning of the dialogue 
phase of the CORE approach.
Obstacles and opportunities for governance were identified 
during the listening phase. The dialogue phase will consist of 
debating alternative courses of action or strategies for addressing 
obstacles and optimizing opportunities. The choice phase will 
consist of planning for and undertaking collaborative activities.
In the AAS Solomon Islands Malaita Hub Design Meeting held in 
Honiara in November 2012, an enabling initiative entitled “cross 
scale governance and scaling” was identified as a priority area for 
research. The initiative identified key target outcomes based on 
this document and the contributing community and stakeholder 
consultations:
•	 traditional values and culture will remain central and basic 
to subsequent initiatives, and
•	 linkages will be made between communities, provinces, 
national government and service delivery systems.
The Research Approach will include: 
•	 situation analysis and identification of potential  
governance approaches,
•	  research to understand what type of cross-scale  
governance are effective, and 
•	 research to understand and learn about ways to scale  
up and out.
An action plan will be developed during 2013 as part of the 
choice phase. This plan will draw on the opportunities identified 
here as well as adaptive learning that will occur during 2013. 
Learning from actions (listening again), debating what to do next 
(dialogue), and adapting (choice) will be an ongoing process. 
A critical analysis of the processes for collaborative governance 
assessment and monitoring in the Solomon Islands context will 
be part of the learning process.
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